Title

An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets

Abstract

In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker's payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms, is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.

Meeting Name

IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015 (2015: Jun. 8-12, London, United Kingdom)

Department(s)

Computer Science

International Standard Book Number (ISBN)

978-146736432-4

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

1550-3607

Document Type

Article - Conference proceedings

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2015 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.

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