An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets
Abstract
In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker's payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms, is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.
Recommended Citation
Q. Liu et al., "An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets," Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications (2015, London, United Kingdom), pp. 567 - 572, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Jun 2015.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2015.7248382
Meeting Name
IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015 (2015: Jun. 8-12, London, United Kingdom)
Department(s)
Computer Science
International Standard Book Number (ISBN)
978-146736432-4
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
1550-3607
Document Type
Article - Conference proceedings
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2015 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Jun 2015
