Breaking Nondeducible Attacks on the Smart Grid

Author

Thomas Roth
Bruce M. McMillin, Missouri University of Science and TechnologyFollow

Abstract

The evolution of the electric power infrastructure into a smart grid carries with it the potential for residential homes to become malicious attackers on global state estimation. This paper presents an attack model where a distributed cyber controller in a smart grid executes an internal attack to falsify its advertised generation. This differs from current attack models in that the attacker is an active element of the system that participates in its normal operation. Through the use of information flow properties, the attack is proven to be nondeducible and thus unidentifiable in a current smart grid architecture. An adaptation of mutual exclusion is then applied to break the nondeducible attack. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.

Recommended Citation

T. Roth and B. M. McMillin, "Breaking Nondeducible Attacks on the Smart Grid," Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7722 LNCS, pp. 80 - 91, Springer, Dec 2013.

The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41485-5_8

Department(s)

Computer Science

Comments

National Science Foundation, Grant EEC- 081212

Keywords and Phrases

cyber-physical; information flow security; power grid

International Standard Book Number (ISBN)

978-364241484-8

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

1611-3349; 0302-9743

Document Type

Article - Conference proceedings

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2024 Springer, All rights reserved.

Publication Date

01 Dec 2013