Physical Attestation of Cyber Processes in the Smart Grid
Abstract
Cyber-physical system security must consider events in both the cyber and physical layers. This paper proves that a cyber process in the smart grid can lie about its physical behavior and remain undetected by its peers. To avoid this scenario, physical attestation is introduced as a distributed mechanism to validate the behavior of a cyber process using physical measurements. A physical attestation protocol is developed for the smart grid, and the protocol is proven to expose malicious cyber behavior. Through the use of physical attestation, the behavior of cyber processes in cyber-physical systems can be verified. © 2013 Springer International Publishing.
Recommended Citation
T. Roth and B. McMillin, "Physical Attestation of Cyber Processes in the Smart Grid," Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 8328 LNCS, pp. 96 - 107, Springer, Dec 2013.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03964-0_9
Department(s)
Computer Science
Keywords and Phrases
information flow security; power grid; remote attestation
International Standard Book Number (ISBN)
978-331903963-3
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
1611-3349; 0302-9743
Document Type
Article - Conference proceedings
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2024 Springer, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Dec 2013
