Does It Pay to Disclose Managerial Earnings Information Early?
Abstract
Does it pay to voluntarily disclose the manager's private information about the firm's earnings prospects before the mandatory announcement date? This question has been a subject of much debate because prior research establishes both benefits and costs of early information disclosure. We provide evidence on the net effect of such disclosure by examining its impact on firm value. Using a large sample and correcting for self-selection bias, we find that early disclosure of the manager's private earnings information enhances the end-of-period value of the firm.
Recommended Citation
Gelles, G. M., Howe, J. S., & Xing, X. (2011). Does It Pay to Disclose Managerial Earnings Information Early?. Journal of Financial Research, 34(2), pp. 365-386. The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2011.01294.x
Department(s)
Economics
Keywords and Phrases
Disclosure; Voluntary disclosure; Earnings forecasts
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
0270-2592; 1475-6803
Document Type
Article - Journal
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2011 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Jun 2011
