Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems
Abstract
Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market- driven mechanisms.
Recommended Citation
T. T. Luo et al., "Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems," IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 68 - 74, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Mar 2017.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600746CM
Department(s)
Computer Science
Research Center/Lab(s)
Center for High Performance Computing Research
Keywords and Phrases
Commerce; Game theory; Bargaining game; Contract Theory; Design Principles; Incentive mechanism; Market driven; Sustainability issues; Trust and reputation systems; Distributed computer systems
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
0163-6804; 1558-1896
Document Type
Article - Journal
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2017 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Mar 2017
Comments
This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under grants CNS- 1545037 and CNS-1545050, in part by the General Research Fund Project CUHK 14206315, and in part by A*STAR Singapore under SERC grant 1224104046.