This paper presents a general theory of event compensation as an information flow security enforcement mechanism for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). The fundamental research problem being investigated is that externally observable events in modern CPSs have the propensity to divulge sensitive settings to adversaries, resulting in a confidentiality violation. This is a less studied yet emerging concern in modern system security. A viable method to mitigate such violations is to use information flow security based enforcement mechanisms since access control based security models cannot impose restrictions on information propagation. Further, the disjoint nature of security analysis is not appropriate for systems with highly integrated physical and cyber infrastructures. The proposed compensation based security framework is foundational work that unifies cyber and physical aspects of security through the shared semantics of information flow. A DC circuit example is presented to demonstrate this concept.

Meeting Name

2010 IEEE 34th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops (COMPSACW)


Computer Science


Future Renewable Electric Energy Distribution Management Center
Missouri University of Science and Technology. Intelligent Systems Center
National Science Foundation (U.S.)

Keywords and Phrases

Cyber-Physical Systems; Execution Monitoring Enforcement; Information Flow Security; Runtime Security

Document Type

Article - Conference proceedings

Document Version

Final Version

File Type





© 2010 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.

Publication Date

01 Jul 2010