Abstract
Modern smart grids, by and large, merge physical interconnections and cyber controllers. Invariably, this tight coupling results in cyber commands manifesting in the physical layer as observable changes, leading to possible disclosure of sensitive system settings. Thus, cyber event confidentiality of the smart grid is violated. Attacks on confidentiality can ultimately lead to integrity and availability attacks; with adequate knowledge of the system topology, internal settings, and how the physical layer responds to cyber commands, a malicious adversary gains knowledge to attack the system. This work shows how to develop self-obfuscating systems based on information flow security properties that can mitigate event confidentiality violations in smart grids. © 2013 IEEE.
Recommended Citation
T. T. Gamage et al., "Mitigating Event Confidentiality Violations in Smart Grids: An Information Flow Security-Based Approach," IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1227 - 1234, article no. 6482697, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Sep 2013.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2013.2243924
Department(s)
Computer Science
Second Department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Keywords and Phrases
Cyber-physical systems; distributed control; distributed detection; logic; power system protection; power system security; security
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
1949-3053
Document Type
Article - Journal
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2024 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
05 Sep 2013
