Security of Information Flow in the Electric Power Grid

Abstract

The confidentiality of information in a system can be breached through unrestricted information flow. the formal properties of non-deducibility and non-inference are often used to assess information flow in purely cyber environments. However, in a "cyber-physical system" (CPS), i.e., a system with significant cyber and physical components, physical actions may allow confidential information to be deduced or inferred. This paper conducts an information flow analysis of a CPS using formal models of confidentiality. the specific CPS under study is the advanced electric power grid using cooperating flexible alternating current transmission system (FACTS) devices. FACTS devices exchange confidential information and use the information to produce physical actions on the electric power grid. This paper shows that even if the information flow satisfies certain security models, confidential information may still be deduced by observation or inference of a CPS at its cyber-physical boundary. the result is important because it helps assess the confidentiality of CPSs. © 2008 by International Federation for Information Processing.

Department(s)

Computer Science

Keywords and Phrases

Confidentiality; Cyber-physical systems; Information flow; Power grid

International Standard Book Number (ISBN)

978-038775461-1

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

1868-4238

Document Type

Article - Conference proceedings

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2024 Springer, All rights reserved.

Publication Date

01 Jan 2008

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