Nondeducibility-Based Analysis of Cyber-physical Systems

Abstract

Controlling information flow in a cyber-physical system (CPS) is challenging because cyber domain decisions and actions manifest themselves as visible changes in the physical domain. This paper presents a nondeducibility-Based observability analysis for CPSs. in many CPSs, the capacity of a low-level (LL) observer to deduce high-level (HL) actions ranges from limited to none. However, a collaborative set of observers strategically located in a network may be able to deduce all the HL actions. This paper models a distributed power electronics control device network using a simple DC circuit in order to understand the effect of multiple observers in a CPS. the analysis reveals that the number of observers required to deduce all the HL actions in a system increases linearly with the number of configurable units. a simple definition of nondeducibility based on the uniqueness of low-level projections is also presented. This definition is used to show that a system with two security domain levels could be considered "nondeducibility secure" if no unique LL projections exist. © IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2009.

Department(s)

Computer Science

Keywords and Phrases

Cyber-physical systems; Information flow security; Nondeducibility

International Standard Book Number (ISBN)

978-364204797-8

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

1868-4238

Document Type

Article - Conference proceedings

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2024 Springer, All rights reserved.

Publication Date

01 Dec 2009

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