Abstract
Some theorists have suggested that the cognitive processes determining a person's performance in a given task are unconscious, making introspection a poor research tool for studying these processes. Others have argued that the relevant processes usually are consciously controlled and can be detailed by asking the person to introspect. Here, a synthesis of these two positions, a dual-factor approach, is proposed. Some of the processes involved in achieving a cognitive goal, such as learning a new concept, are viewed as unconscious and automatic; however, other processes are intentionally allocated conscious attention, in certain tasks, to accomplish other goal. To illustrate this dual-factor position, evidence is presented in support of the view that when concept learning occurs solely by automatic frequency processing, introspective reports are inaccurate, but when the nature of the task prompts intentional hypothesis testing, introspective reports are accurate, revealing clues that subjects engage in a conscious hypothesis sting strategy. © 1982 Psychonomic Society, Inc.
Recommended Citation
Kellogg, R. T. (1982). When Can We Introspect Accurately About Mental Processes?. Memory & Cognition, 10(2), pp. 141-144. Springer; Psychonomic Society.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03209215
Department(s)
Psychological Science
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
1532-5946; 0090-502X
Document Type
Article - Journal
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2023 Springer; Psychonomic Society, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Mar 1982
PubMed ID
7087777
