Dynamics of Games and Genes: Discrete Versus Continuous Time

Abstract

It is shown that in the classical model of population genetics (Fisher-Wright-Haldane, discrete or continuous version) every solution p(t) converges to equilibrium for t → ∞. For related models of evolutionary games (with non-symmetric matrices) it is shown that the transformation that describes the dynamics is a diffeomorphism (in particular one-to-one). © 1983 Springer-Verlag.

Department(s)

Mathematics and Statistics

Keywords and Phrases

Convergence to equilibrium; Evolutionary games; Population genetics

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

1432-1416; 0303-6812

Document Type

Article - Journal

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2026 Springer, All rights reserved.

Publication Date

01 Jun 1983

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