Dynamics of Games and Genes: Discrete Versus Continuous Time
Abstract
It is shown that in the classical model of population genetics (Fisher-Wright-Haldane, discrete or continuous version) every solution p(t) converges to equilibrium for t → ∞. For related models of evolutionary games (with non-symmetric matrices) it is shown that the transformation that describes the dynamics is a diffeomorphism (in particular one-to-one). © 1983 Springer-Verlag.
Recommended Citation
V. Losert and E. Akin, "Dynamics of Games and Genes: Discrete Versus Continuous Time," Journal of Mathematical Biology, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 241 - 251, Springer, Jun 1983.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00305762
Department(s)
Mathematics and Statistics
Keywords and Phrases
Convergence to equilibrium; Evolutionary games; Population genetics
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
1432-1416; 0303-6812
Document Type
Article - Journal
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2026 Springer, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Jun 1983
