The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Good Strategies and their Dynamics

Author

Ethan Akin, Missouri University of Science and TechnologyFollow

Abstract

For the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, there exist Markov strategies that solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long-term average payoff. When used by both players, these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither player can benefit by moving unilaterally any other strategy, i.e., these are Nash equilibria. In addition, if a player uses instead an alternative that decreases the opponent's payoff below the cooperative level, then his own payoff is decreased as well. Thus, if we limit attention to the long-term payoff, these good strategies effectively stabilize cooperative behavior. We characterize these good strategies and analyze their role in evolutionary dynamics.

Recommended Citation

E. Akin, "The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Good Strategies and their Dynamics," Ergodic Theory Advances in Dynamical Systems, pp. 77 - 107, De Gruyter Brill, Jun 2016.

The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110461510-004

Department(s)

Mathematics and Statistics

Keywords and Phrases

Evolutionary game dynamics; Iterated play; Markov strategies; Press-Dyson equations; Prisoner's Dilemma; Stable cooperative behavior; Zero-determinant strategies

International Standard Book Number (ISBN)

978-311046086-5;978-311046151-0

Document Type

Article - Journal

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2026 De Gruyter Brill, All rights reserved.

Publication Date

20 Jun 2016