Non-Collaborative Emission Targets Joining and Quantity Flow Decisions in a Stackelberg Setting
Abstract
This study considers a Stackelberg channel, where the leader determines the quantity flow along the channel. Both the leader and the follower have emission targets and the leader should respect those targets. In this setting, the leader and the follower can join their emission targets to lower costs while ensuring that the channel emissions do not exceed the cumulative target. The decisions for joining targets define a non-collaborative game between the leader and the follower. We characterize the equilibrium of this game. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of channel leadership. A manufacturer-retailer scenario is used to demonstrate the model.
Recommended Citation
D. Konur, "Non-Collaborative Emission Targets Joining and Quantity Flow Decisions in a Stackelberg Setting," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, vol. 105, pp. 60 - 82, Elsevier, Sep 2017.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2017.06.010
Department(s)
Engineering Management and Systems Engineering
Research Center/Lab(s)
Intelligent Systems Center
Keywords and Phrases
Emission control; Freight transport; Game theory; Leadership; Manufacturing; Retailing; Transportation planning; Emission target; Non-collaborative; Quantity flow; Stackelberg
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
1366-5545
Document Type
Article - Journal
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2017 Elsevier, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Sep 2017
Comments
This work is partially supported by the Interdisciplinary Intercampus research program of the University of Missouri System; and the National University Transportation Center and the Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering at the Missouri University of Science and Technology.