Title

Does It Pay to Disclose Managerial Earnings Information Early?

Abstract

Does it pay to voluntarily disclose the manager's private information about the firm's earnings prospects before the mandatory announcement date? This question has been a subject of much debate because prior research establishes both benefits and costs of early information disclosure. We provide evidence on the net effect of such disclosure by examining its impact on firm value. Using a large sample and correcting for self-selection bias, we find that early disclosure of the manager's private earnings information enhances the end-of-period value of the firm.

Department(s)

Economics

Keywords and Phrases

Disclosure; Voluntary disclosure; Earnings forecasts

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

0270-2592; 1475-6803

Document Type

Article - Journal

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2011 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association, All rights reserved.

Publication Date

01 Jun 2011

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