Abstract
A security policy for a distributed system can be checked for compliance at run-time, as the system executes, using assertions embedded in software. This paper presents the concept of run-time security assurance, according to a given security policy for a given distributed system, along with mechanisms for its usage. A model problem illustrates the implementation of executable security assertions and their run-time validation on histories (traces) of events.
Recommended Citation
Serban, C. and McMillin, B., "From Formal Security Specifications to Executable Assertions - A Distributed Systems Preliminary Study" (1995). Computer Science Technical Reports. 180.
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/comsci_techreports/180
Department(s)
Computer Science
Report Number
CSc-95-01
Document Type
Technical Report
Document Version
Final Version
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 1995 University of Missouri - Rolla, All rights reserved
Publication Date
27 April, 1995
Comments
The first Author is a Graduate Student
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant number MSS-9216479, and, in part, by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under contract numbers F49620-92-J-0546 and F49620-93-I-0409.