Cyber-Physical Security of an Electric Microgrid
Abstract
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are physical systems that are controlled or monitored by computer-based systems. CPS are a combination of computation, networking, and physical processes. As CPS are a combination of various diverse components, they are vulnerable to several security threats. Moreover, there are many different security domains (not just high/low, nor are they necessarily hierarchical). This paper utilizes previouslydeveloped Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility to uncover potential integrity vulnerabilities in an electric microgrid. These are then mitigated, to the extent possible, by adding executable invariants on system operation. Implementation on the Electric Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC) testbed at the Singapore University of Technology and Design are reported. Limitations of the design and successes/shortcomings of attack mitigation are reported.
Recommended Citation
P. Palaniswamy and B. M. McMillin, "Cyber-Physical Security of an Electric Microgrid," Proceedings of the IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (2018, Taipei, Taiwan), pp. 74 - 83, IEEE Computer Society, Dec 2018.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2018.00018
Meeting Name
IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, PRDC 2018 (2018: Dec. 4-7, Taipei, Taiwan)
Department(s)
Computer Science
Research Center/Lab(s)
Intelligent Systems Center
Keywords and Phrases
Design; Embedded systems; Cyber physicals; Information flows; MSDND; Security; Smart grid; Cyber Physical System
International Standard Book Number (ISBN)
978-1-5386-5700-3
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
2473-3105
Document Type
Article - Conference proceedings
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2018 IEEE Computer Society, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Dec 2018
Comments
This work was sponsored by a grant from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Grant Number 60NANB15D236 and with support from the Missouri S&T Intelligent Systems Center and by a grant from the US National Science Foundation under award number CNS-1505610.