Smart water metering (SWM) infrastructure collects real-Time water usage data that is useful for automated billing, leak detection, and forecasting of peak periods. Cyber/physical attacks can lead to data falsification on water usage data. This paper proposes a learning approach that converts smart water meter data into a Pythagorean mean-based invariant that is highly stable under normal conditions but deviates under attacks. We show how adversaries can launch deductive or camouflage attacks in the SWM infrastructure to gain benefits and impact the water distribution utility. Then, we apply a two-Tier approach of stateless and stateful detection, reducing false alarms without significantly sacrificing the attack detection rate. We validate our approach using real-world water usage data of 92 households in Alicante, Spain for varying attack scales and strengths and prove that our method limits the impact of undetected attacks and expected time between consecutive false alarms. Our results show that even for low-strength, low-scale deductive attacks, the model limits the impact of an undetected attack to only C0.2199375 and for high-strength, low-scale camouflage attack, the impact of an undetected attack was limited to C1.434375
A. Oluyomi et al., "Detection Of False Data Injection In Smart Water Metering Infrastructure," Proceedings - 2023 IEEE International Conference on Smart Computing, SMARTCOMP 2023, pp. 267 - 272, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Jan 2023.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/SMARTCOMP58114.2023.00070
Keywords and Phrases
Anomaly detection; False data injection; Smart Water Meter; Smart Water Metering Infrastructure
Article - Conference proceedings
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01 Jan 2023