Keywords and Phrases
Biochips; Cyber-Physical Systems; Digital Microfluidics; Information Flow Security; Point-Of-Care Diagnostics
“Due to the devastating global impact that infectious diseases have had, especially in developing countries, the demand for access to adequate resources to combat sickness continues to be a heavy burden. Reliable and affordable diagnostics is a vital first line of defense in fighting outbreaks and providing accurate treatment. Digital microfluidics biochips capable of running multiple diagnostic tests on a single platform are an emerging technology that are increasingly being evaluated as a viable platform for rapid diagnosis and point-of-care field deployment. Although these systems offer many benefits, processing errors are inherent. Therefore, cyber-physical digital biochips are being investigated that offer higher reliability through the inclusion of automated error recovery mechanisms that can reconfigure the electrode array at runtime. These mechanisms allow additional fluid handling operations to be re-executed if issues occur. Despite these advantages, there are risks. Recent research has begun to explore security vulnerabilities of digital microfluidic systems that could negatively impact accurate test reporting. In this work the Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility (MSDND) framework is used to explore Stuxnet-type vulnerabilities that exist due to implicit trust in cyber-physical monitors. This thesis proposes a methodology for detecting such real-time attacks against cyber-physical digital microfluidic systems using physical attestation of biochemical processes to create beneficial information flow paths”--Abstract, page iii.
McMillin, Bruce M.
M.S. in Computer Science
Missouri University of Science and Technology
vii, 48 pages
© 2021 Fredrick Eugene Love II, All rights reserved.
Thesis - Open Access
Love, Fredrick Eugene II, "Biochemical assay invariant attestation for the security of cyber-physical digital microfluidic biochips" (2021). Masters Theses. 8018.