Keywords and Phrases
Information flow security properties; Nondeducibility security
"Fundamentally, inherently observable events in Cyber-Physical Systems with tight coupling between cyber and physical components can result in a confidentiality violation. By observing how the physical elements react to cyber commands, adversaries can identify critical links in the system and force the cyber control algorithm to make erroneous decisions. Thus, there is a propensity for a breach in confidentiality leading to further attacks on availability or integrity. Due to the highly integrated nature of Cyber-Physical Systems, it is also extremely difficult to map the system semantics into a security framework under existing security models. The far-reaching objective of this research is to develop a science of selfobfuscating systems based on the composition of simple building blocks. A model of Nondeducibility composes the building blocks under Information Flow Security Properties. To this end, this work presents fundamental theories on external observability for basic regular networks and the novel concept of "event compensation" that can enforce Information Flow Security Properties at runtime"--Abstract, page iii.
McMillin, Bruce M.
Hurson, A. R.
Ph. D. in Computer Science
Free Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM)
Missouri University of Science and Technology. Intelligent Systems Center
National Science Foundation (U.S.)
Intelligent Systems Center
Missouri University of Science and Technology
x, 123 pages
Note about bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 114-122).
© 2011 Thoshitha Thanushka Gamage, All rights reserved.
Dissertation - Open Access
Data protection -- Security measures
Sensor networks -- Security measures
Wireless sensor networks
Print OCLC #
Electronic OCLC #
Link to Catalog Record
Gamage, Thoshitha T., "CEEME: compensating events based execution monitoring enforcement for Cyber-Physical Systems" (2011). Doctoral Dissertations. 2013.