Integrated project delivery (IPD) method is associated with numerous benefits, including enhanced project performance, collaboration, and information sharing among project stakeholders. However, the lack of adequate incentive and reward mechanisms is still considered as the main reason for slowing down the adoption of IPD. As such, the goal of this paper is to identify a fair and efficient risk pool distribution among IPD project stakeholders. The adopted methodology included (1) assigning the risks associated with each stakeholder, (2) computing valuations for all possible subset coalitions among IPD project stakeholders that reflect their risk control capabilities as well as their coordination effects, and (3) utilizing cooperative game theory to generate fair and efficient distribution mechanisms given different a priori working and coalitional preferences. As such, a total of 22 risks were identified and quantified to calculate the risk control valuations of all subset coalitions using Monte-Carlo simulations. Afterward, these valuations were utilized to generate fair risk and reward distributions using the Shapley value and Owen value for games with a priori unions. The coalitional stability of the generated results was evaluated using propensity-to-disrupt ratios. Ultimately, the findings of this paper indicate that an IPD-multiparty agreement where all parties are engaged early on in establishing the contract results in the most balanced willingness to cooperate among stakeholders. Finally, the outcome of this paper equips industry practitioners with a distribution mechanism that corresponds to the adopted IPD relational configuration on one hand and the overall IPD project stability on the other.


Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering

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Article - Conference proceedings

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Publication Date

01 Jan 2024