Location

Havener Center, Miner Lounge / Wiese Atrium, 1:30pm-3:30pm

Start Date

4-2-2026 1:30 PM

End Date

4-2-2026 3:30 PM

Presentation Date

April 2, 2026; 1:30pm-3:30pm

Description

Federated Learning (FL) leverages the intelligence of untrusted distributed devices through collaborative training. This makes the training process susceptible to malicious behavior. Existing defense mechanisms largely consider an adversary who attacks a proactive FL server without any adaptability. However, they overlook the presence of a strategic adversary. To address this challenge, our work proposes a Robust Game-theoretic framework where the adversary is both strategic and is equipped with the capability of performing large-scale poisoning attacks.

Biography

Manoj Twarakavi is a Ph.D. Student in the Department of Computer Science at Missouri University of Science and Technology, where he is advised by Professor Siddhardh Nadendla. His research focuses on Internet of Things, Machine Learning, Cybersecurity and Game Theory. Prior to joining Missouri S&T, Mr. Twarakavi earned a Master's degree in Computer Science from the University of Texas at Arlington and a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science and Engineering from M.S. Ramaiah Institute of Technology, India.

Meeting Name

2026 - Miners Solving for Tomorrow Research Conference

Department(s)

Computer Science

Comments

Advisor: V. Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla, nadendla@mst.edu

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Document Type

Poster

Document Version

Final Version

File Type

event

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2026 The Authors, All rights reserved

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Apr 2nd, 1:30 PM Apr 2nd, 3:30 PM

Robust Federated Learning with Strategic Adversaries

Havener Center, Miner Lounge / Wiese Atrium, 1:30pm-3:30pm

Federated Learning (FL) leverages the intelligence of untrusted distributed devices through collaborative training. This makes the training process susceptible to malicious behavior. Existing defense mechanisms largely consider an adversary who attacks a proactive FL server without any adaptability. However, they overlook the presence of a strategic adversary. To address this challenge, our work proposes a Robust Game-theoretic framework where the adversary is both strategic and is equipped with the capability of performing large-scale poisoning attacks.