Combating Data Leakage Trojans in Sequential Circuits through Randomized Encoding


Globalization of micro-chip fabrication has opened a new avenue of cyber-crime. It is now possible to insert hardware Trojans directly into the chip during the manufacturing process. These hardware Trojans are capable of destroying a chip, reducing performance or even capturing sensitive data. This paper presents a modification to a recently presented method of Trojan defense known as RECORD: Randomized Encoding of COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage. RECORD aims to prevent data leakage through a randomized encoding and split manufacturing scheme. Its weakness, however, it that it is only applicable to combinational circuits. Sequential RECORD proposes a method to extend RECORD concepts to sequential designs. Experimental work with Sequential RECORD on a Data Encryption Standard circuit show that it is effective with the cost of a 3.75x area overhead, 4.5x power overhead and only a 3% decrease in performance.

Meeting Name

2017 IEEE 15th International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, 15th International Conference on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, 3rd International Conference on Big Data Intelligence and Computing and Cyber Science and Technology Congress, DASC/PiCom/DataCom/CyberSciTech (2017: Nov. 6-10, Orlando, FL)


Electrical and Computer Engineering

Keywords and Phrases

Computation theory; Cryptography; Encoding (symbols); Hardware; Hardware security; Malware; Manufacture; Sequential circuits; Signal encoding; Timing circuits; Area overhead; Combinational logic; Cyber-crimes; Data encryption standard; Manufacturing process; Power overhead; Sensitive datas; Sequential design; Big data

International Standard Book Number (ISBN)


Document Type

Article - Conference proceedings

Document Version


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© 2017 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.

Publication Date

01 Nov 2017