Title

Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems

Abstract

Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market- driven mechanisms.

Department(s)

Computer Science

Comments

This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under grants CNS- 1545037 and CNS-1545050, in part by the General Research Fund Project CUHK 14206315, and in part by A*STAR Singapore under SERC grant 1224104046.

Keywords and Phrases

Commerce; Game theory; Bargaining game; Contract Theory; Design Principles; Incentive mechanism; Market driven; Sustainability issues; Trust and reputation systems; Distributed computer systems

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

0163-6804; 1558-1896

Document Type

Article - Journal

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2017 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.

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