An Internal Model Principle for the Attacker in Distributed Control Systems
Abstract
Although adverse effects of attacks have been acknowledged in many cyber-physical systems, there is no rigorous mathematical analysis to characterize their worst effects in distributed multi-agent systems. Without characterizing these attacks, one cannot empower the agents with resilient functionalities to mitigate them. To this end, we will take the role of the attacker to show that in a distributed control system, an attacker can destabilize the whole synchronization process by injecting a state-independent attack signal into sensors or actuators of a single root node or to its outgoing communication links. This will be called the internal model principle for the attacker and will intensify the urgency of designing novel control protocols to mitigate these types of attacks.
Recommended Citation
R. Moghadam and H. Modares, "An Internal Model Principle for the Attacker in Distributed Control Systems," Proceedings of the 56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control (2017, Melbourne, Australia), pp. 6604 - 6609, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Jan 2018.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2017.8264655
Meeting Name
2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017 (2017: Dec. 12-15, Melbourne, Australia)
Department(s)
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Keywords and Phrases
Embedded Systems; Multi Agent Systems, Adverse Effect; Control Protocols; Distributed Multiagent Systems; Internal Model Principle; Mathematical Analysis; Root Nodes; Sensors Or Actuators; Synchronization Process, Distributed Parameter Control Systems
International Standard Book Number (ISBN)
978-150902873-3
Document Type
Article - Conference proceedings
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2018 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Jan 2018
