Title

An Internal Model Principle for the Attacker in Distributed Control Systems

Abstract

Although adverse effects of attacks have been acknowledged in many cyber-physical systems, there is no rigorous mathematical analysis to characterize their worst effects in distributed multi-agent systems. Without characterizing these attacks, one cannot empower the agents with resilient functionalities to mitigate them. To this end, we will take the role of the attacker to show that in a distributed control system, an attacker can destabilize the whole synchronization process by injecting a state-independent attack signal into sensors or actuators of a single root node or to its outgoing communication links. This will be called the internal model principle for the attacker and will intensify the urgency of designing novel control protocols to mitigate these types of attacks.

Meeting Name

2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017 (2017: Dec. 12-15, Melbourne, Australia)

Department(s)

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Keywords and Phrases

Embedded Systems; Multi Agent Systems, Adverse Effect; Control Protocols; Distributed Multiagent Systems; Internal Model Principle; Mathematical Analysis; Root Nodes; Sensors Or Actuators; Synchronization Process, Distributed Parameter Control Systems

International Standard Book Number (ISBN)

978-150902873-3

Document Type

Article - Conference proceedings

Document Version

Citation

File Type

text

Language(s)

English

Rights

© 2018 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), All rights reserved.

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