Effects of Subjective Biases on Strategic Information Transmission
In this paper, we study the effects of subjective biases on strategic information transmission (SIT) within a Stackelberg game setting, where a human transmitter (leader) communicates an encoded source message to a human receiver (follower) so that the receiver decodes back a desired version of the original source signal. We model human decisions using Rieger-Wang’s prospect theory, which is an extension of traditional prospect theory to continuous decision spaces. Having found a closedform expression for the receiver’s best response strategy under any general setting, we consider two settings: Gaussian SIT games and exponential SIT games. While the Gaussian SIT games result in strategies that are independent of subjective biases of both the transmitter and the receiver, we show that the equilibrium strategies in exponential SIT games depend on the subjective biases of both the transmitter and the receiver. Numerical results are presented to illustrate results in both Gaussian and exponential settings.
V. S. Nadendla et al., "Effects of Subjective Biases on Strategic Information Transmission," Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Aug 2018.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/TCOMM.2018.2866571
Keywords and Phrases
Communication systems; Economics; Exponential test channel; Games; Gaussian test channel; Integrated circuit modeling; Nonlinear distortion; Prospect Theory; Radio transmitters; Receivers; Strategic Information Transmission
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
Article - Journal
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