Physical Attestation in the Smart Grid for Distributed State Verification
Abstract
A malicious process in a distributed system can fabricate its internal state in its communications with its peers. These state fabrications can cause other processes in the distributed system to make incorrect control decisions. Smart grid systems have a unique advantage in the detection of falsified state attacks because process control decisions have an observable effect on a shared physical infrastructure. The physical infrastructure acts as a high-integrity message channel that broadcasts changes in individual process states. This work proposes a new distributed security mechanism called physical attestation that combines physical feedback with methods from computer security to detect state fabrications in the smart grid. The theory of physical attestation is proven using an information flow security property called nondeducibility, and supported with experimental results from a simulation test bed.
Recommended Citation
T. Roth and B. M. McMillin, "Physical Attestation in the Smart Grid for Distributed State Verification," Proceedings of the 41st IEEE Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (2017, Turin, Italy), vol. 1, pp. 626 - 627, IEEE Computer Society, Jul 2017.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/COMPSAC.2017.188
Meeting Name
41st IEEE Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference, COMPSAC 2017 (2017: Jul. 4-8, Turin, Italy)
Department(s)
Computer Science
Keywords and Phrases
Cyber Security; Distributed Computing; Information Security; Smart Grids
International Standard Book Number (ISBN)
978-1-5386-0367-3
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
0730-3157
Document Type
Article - Conference proceedings
Document Version
Citation
File Type
text
Language(s)
English
Rights
© 2017 IEEE Computer Society, All rights reserved.
Publication Date
01 Jul 2017
